MAINSTREAM, VOL L, NO 1, DECEMBER 24, 2011 (ANNUAL
2011)
The true meaning of the Anna phenomenon would be
known only in due course of time. In the meantime, the debate surrounding the
Anna movement has got so much charged up that it is becoming difficult to make
a political judgment (…) Ambedkar,
quoting Greek historian Grote, had extensively dwelt on the importance of
‘constitutional morality’ in the representative democracy due to the
possibility of a distance between the people and their representatives. He said
‘constitutional morality is not a natural sentiment. It has to be cultivated.
We must realise that our people have yet to learn it.
Democracy in India is only a top-dressing on an
Indian soil, which is essentially undemocratic. The upshot of his statement is
quite clear—the spectre of the ‘grammar of anarchy’ is the speed-governor in
institutional democracy whereas ‘constitutional morality’ as self-restraint
should constitute the ground rule for the free play of democratic politics. But
the moot point is: whether the political class in today’s India can claim
adherence to it. Does not this appropriation of Ambedkar’s argument from the
Constituent Assembly debates by all and sundry today look insincere, selective
and insensitive to the larger context in which it was presented, with the
obvious intention of just running away from a more nuanced and reasoned debate
on the issues in question?
However, the question as to whether the
representative is a trustee of the people’s will or a mere delegate, who is to
be continuously commanded by the constituents, is itself an open and unresolved
issue in the annals of representative democracy since the time of Burke and
Mill, who had strained their nerves to come to a definite answer to this
dilemma. The present turmoil on the issue of enacting a Lokpal Bill seems to
have further aggravated this unresolved riddle of democratic politics, which
has been smouldering since the time direct democracy of a participatory mode
made way for the indirect one; along with the resultant question as to whether
authorisation through election implies giving a carte blanche to the
representatives till the next election to do whatever they may consider and
construe to be the constituents’ interests. Or, are the representatives only
delegates, who have to take directive and command from the people, whom they
represent, from time to time and at different stages of political transactions?
Not only this. Would the represented, when they feel that their mandate has
been betrayed, be within their democratic right to demand an account from their
representatives and foist their will on them through democratic means, even
before the expiry of their electoral term?
Though, what constitutes democratic means in a
democratic polity is itself an unsettled matter in today’s context, as
electoral politics no longer performs its role as the only dependable channel
of democratic transactions for the people due to a number of its operative
deformities. And one thing is very clear that these posers are growing in
importance by the day due to the legitimacy-deficit of the elected
representatives and each time they are put forth by a discontented civil
society, they only cast a longer shadow on the fate of representative democracy
which often waxes eloquent about the procedural legitimacy, institutional
efficacy and neutrality of its political space. One of the members of Team
Anna, Prashant Bhushan, observes that ‘the representative democracy was
developed at a time and in the circumstances when there was no mechanism
available to know the views of the people on various issues on a continuous
basis. But with the technological advances attained over the years, we can now
move in the direction of more meaningful involvement of the civil society in the
governance through dialogue and deliberations.’ By saying so, he rakes up a
crucial issue; that is, the issue of accountability and responsiveness of the
representatives towards their constituents in a democracy.
One of the authorities on the political representation,
Hanna Pitkin, has said that ‘responsiveness need not to be constant activity in
the representative democratic system. But there has to be a constant condition
of responsiveness in the sense that the potential readiness of the
representatives to respond should ever be present. … The age-old conundrum of
democratic accountability is as relevant today as it was when direct
participatory democracy transited towards a representative system. Now it is
being proved again and again that the accountability and responsiveness issues
are valid in themselves and have to be settled on their own terms. They can
neither be taken care of within the emotive politics of group rights, as the
failure of the social justice politics and their champions in some of the
Indian States to stand accountable to their own social constituency, which had
reposed so much faith in them, would bear it out. Nor can they be mortgaged to
the abstract liberal democratic discourse of institutional neutrality,
constitutional oath and secular fidelity, as their omissions and commissions
have now become political folklore. Hence, if such meanings are derived from
the Anna phenomenon, it would be a better service to the cause of Indian
democracy than hiding behind the political rhetoric of parliamentary
sovereignty and the civil society’s deformities in India.
It hardly needs any mention that India has neither gone for
parliamentary sovereignty of the British type, nor has it adopted the judicial
supremacy of the American variety. It has, instead, settled for a doctrine of
‘constitutional supremacy’, which proclaims sovereignty of the people. Can
anyone overlook the fact that the Constitution of India swears in the name of
‘we the people’ at the very outset and this precedes everything else including
the institution of Parliament? The author is an Associate Professor in
Political Science, RLAE College, University
of Delhi.